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In October 1962 Harold Macmillan had been Prime Minister for nearly six years and been 
keeping a regular diary since 1950. His contemporaneous scrawled diary references to what 
was described therein as ‘the World Crisis’ became the first account Macmillan provided of 
the Cuban stand-off. On 4 November 1962, with the high-point of the crisis seemingly passed 
during the previous weekend, Macmillan then provided a second account, a lengthy entry in 
which he tried to order his thoughts on the causes, resolution and consequences of the Cuban 
missile crisis.2 This was reproduced almost in toto at the close of the chapter, ‘On the Brink’, 
about Cuba in the sixth and last volume of his memoirs, At the End of the Day. This, covering 
the period 1961-1963, was published on 26 September 1973 in Britain and on 9 January 1974 
in the US. Highlights from the memoirs were serialised before the publication of each volume 
in the Sunday Times. Publication was also marked by a televised interview with Macmillan, 
with the relevant section on Cuba being broadcast on BBC1 at 9.25pm on 19 September 
1973. As well as a radio version, this programme was repeated on 27 October 1974 and 
again, following Macmillan’s death in 1986, in January 1987. Furthermore, an edited 
transcript appeared in the BBC’s The Listener magazine.3 Macmillan thus retold his version 
of the Cuban missile crisis – and other aspects of his career – many times, in a wide range of 
media. In the process he also, as the BBC head of Current Affairs, John Grist, observed of an 
earlier broadcast interview, ‘polished the words of his stories’.4 The result was that, 
particularly for British audiences, Macmillan’s successive accounts helped to shape public 
understandings of the Cuban missile crisis. 
At the time of the Cuban missile crisis Macmillan was 68 and by the time his memoir of that 
episode appeared he was nearing his eightieth birthday. As the broadcast made clear, he 
nevertheless remained mentally robust, returning to manage the family publishing firm after 
his health-induced retirement from the Premiership in 1963.5 This helps to explain how the 
autobiography of ‘Mr Harold’ eventually ran to 3,763 pages and some 1.5 million words. 
Macmillan significantly chose to start work on the memoirs on 4 August 1964, the fiftieth 
anniversary of the most traumatic experience of his life, the outbreak of the Great War, He set 
out deliberately to reflect on the dramatic changes, not least the decline of Europe and the rise 
of the rival empires of the Americans and the Soviets who confronted each other over Cuba, 
which ensued from that disaster. In the process he deliberately modelled himself on the multi-
volume memoirs of his great mentor and predecessor, Winston Churchill.6 
The work was financed by the contract for £360,000 signed between the book trust 
Macmillan established as the owner of his literary estate and the Thomson Organisation, 
including serial rights in the Sunday Times, ‘of which £34,000 is to be paid to me in 4 annual 
instalments to write the book and pay the assistants etc’.7 Thomson in turn contracted the 
American rights with Harper & Row, while the book contract with the family firm of 
Macmillan & Company for the rest of the world was seemingly a more modest £45,000.8  
Whilst Prime Minister Macmillan had prepared for the eventual memoirs by again copying 
Churchill, in this case by taking away duplicates of all possible documents for his private 
archive.9 Ironically, in doing so Macmillan directly contravened his own guidelines on the 
writing of ministerial memoirs laid down in the Cabinet memorandum in 1961: 
I attach particular important to the point….that special difficulty arises over memoirs 
which are constructed on the basis of official documents and keep closely to the 
wording of these documents, whether by quotation or by paraphrase. For this as well 
as for other reasons it is specially desirable that Ministers should not retain official 
documents in their private possession on relinquishing office….I hope that, when the 
times comes, all my colleagues will be careful to comply with this rule.10 
He also went through the million words of his diaries selecting passages to be transcribed for 
possible inclusion by his two secretarial assistants, who were at this stage in this process 
Anne Macpherson and Bunty Morley. For instance, just over 70 per cent of the diaries for 
1962 were selected for transcription in this way. These voluminous materials, supplemented 
by books and correspondence, were piled high in the old billiard room in Birch Grove, 
Macmillan’s country house in Sussex. At the end of 1964 Anne Glyn-Jones arrived as his 
archivist and was told to ‘browse about a bit’ through these piles. This she did, producing 
folders of material relevant to each chapter. From the third volume onwards she also 
organised into thematic chapters the structure of each instalment of the memoirs.11  
When Glyn-Jones came to sorting the material for ‘On the Brink’, the diary entries from ten 
years earlier were mainly of use for the opening days of the crisis. Macmillan padded these 
out with messages from Kennedy and the British ambassador to Washington, David Ormsby-
Gore, and particularly with transcripts from the telephone conversations he had with Kennedy 
during the crisis. This, as was no doubt intended, gives the feeling of a blow-by-blow account 
by a closely-involved participant. The relative paucity of diary entries and the alternative 
material selected also inevitably privileged Prime Minister-Presidential relations. Only a 
close reading of the chapter reveals how important other dimensions of the crisis – such as 
the role of the United Nations [UN] – were to the Prime Minister at the time. The repeated 
references to the Acting Secretary-General U Thant,12 for instance, are subsumed within this 
dialogue with Kennedy. 
U Thant was also relatively overlooked in Macmillan’s contemporary diary entries. The first 
reference to the Cuban missile crisis in the diaries is to the message received from President 
Kennedy at Chequers at 10pm on Sunday 21 October 1962, warning of the Soviet build-up, 
though in ‘On the Brink’ he refers obliquely to the guarded indications given to British 
intelligence officials in Washington two days before.13 At the time he wrote the chapter he 
was not aware of the extensive debates raging in Kennedy’s specially-convened Executive 
Committee (ExComm) since 16 October. ‘On the Brink’ nevertheless begins with 
Macmillan’s view of the origins of the crisis from Castro’s seizure of power in Cuba in 1959. 
He does not recapitulate the critical comments about American policy towards this new 
regime in his diaries from 1960, though ‘On the Brink’ does reproduce the scepticism he 
expressed to then President Eisenhower about the likely efficacy of sanctions against the 
Cubans.14 The chapter then jumps to the start of the crisis, passing over episodes like the Bay 
of Pigs in silence. Macmillan had been aware of planning for this attempt to overthrow Castro 
aided by the Americans, but never considered it likely to succeed.  
Nor were the British inclined to share the Administration’s anxiety to lance the Cuban boil, or 
the methods they selected to do so. One of Macmillan’s constant refrains was the need for 
trade expansion, not least as a means of tying-in countries to the West. The embargo of all 
trade with Cuba except medical supplies announced by Kennedy on 3 February 1962 was a 
step in the opposite direction and unwelcome in London. Sanctions were seen as slow and 
ineffective. The British had previously refused Castro’s request for jet fighters under 
American pressure. However, Kennedy’s urging of British support for the embargo to Lord 
Home, the British Foreign Secretary, during the latter’s Washington visit in late September 
1962, as the President moved towards difficult mid-term elections, met with observations that 
British shipping interests could only be coerced by new legislation difficult to justify in 
peacetime. Macmillan concluded therefore in a note to Home of 1 October, ‘there is no 
reason for us to help the Americans on Cuba’.15 Such interventions, as the Minister of State at 
the Foreign Office, Joseph Godber, pointed out would ‘merely force Castro to depend more 
and more completely on the Soviet Union’.16 Indeed, it appears that a combination of US 
trade pressure and military exercises suggesting imminent invasion of Cuba helped, as this 
view might have predicted, to create the circumstances in which the Soviet leader, Nikita 
Khrushchev, decided in May 1962 to send missiles to Castro.17  
 
Macmillan, however, does not appear to have suspected this either in his diary entry of 4 
November 1962, or at the time of writing ‘On the Brink’. Instead, he speculated that 
Khrushchev’s motive was to threaten the embattled outpost of West Berlin. Indeed, his only 
diary reference in 1962 to Cuba prior to the outbreak of the crisis was, in noting on Home’s 
return from Washington his objections to a trade embargo that ‘The Russians are clearly 
using Cuba as a counter-irritant to Berlin’.18 Nor did Macmillan note at the time or 
subsequently the growing pressure on Kennedy from senior Republicans, particularly Senator 
Kenneth Keating, claiming that the Soviets were deploying missiles in Cuba,19 even though 
he hints that British intelligence also suggested a build-up of some kind there.20  
 
Keating’s claim was publicly denied by Kennedy on 4 September 1962. Nevertheless, from 
August the President began to receive daily intelligence reports on Cuba. Conclusive proof 
both of missiles and Il-28 bombers being assembled was finally provided by an U2 over-
flight on 14 October and presented to the President in Washington at 8.45am on 16 October. 
Thereafter Kennedy’s hastily-convened Executive Committee (ExComm) debated what to do, 
but neither Ormsby-Gore nor David Bruce, the US ambassador to London, were officially 
told of the crisis until 21 October,21 earlier in the day than Macmillan. 
 
Apparently Kennedy decided initially not to consult the British because he felt ‘They’ll just 
object’ to the idea of a military response. There was agreement in ExComm that Macmillan 
and President de Gaulle of France should be given 24 hours’ notice of action.22 However, the 
Americans only moved to informing their allies of the crisis as their thinking shifted instead 
to a limited naval blockade,23 to commence on 24 October. Nevertheless, Macmillan’s 
reaction to Kennedy in their first telephone conversation of the crisis late on 22 October – 
only briefly mentioned in ‘On the Brink’24 – was very similar to Kennedy’s own a week 
earlier, arguing that the President ought ‘to seize Cuba and have done with it’.25 In contrast, 
Macmillan was doubtful both about a blockade’s legality and it speedily achieving its 
objectives; in which case Kennedy might find that ‘he may never get rid of Cuban rockets 
except by trading them for Turkish, Italian or other bases’. Indeed, early in that conversation 
he asked ‘What are you going to do with the blockade? Are you going to occupy Cuba and 
have done with it or is it going to just drag on?’ Kennedy, however, did not want to pursue 
that option because it ‘invites [Khrushchev] so directly into Berlin’. Furthermore, such action 
would require seven days to mobilise.26 What it did not require was a similar build-up of 
NATO forces, with resulting public alarm. Macmillan therefore, as he recounts in ‘On the 
Brink’ rebuffed hints from Washington of the need for heightened alert levels.27  
Apart from mentioning ‘certain precautions affecting the Royal Air Force’ Macmillan had 
nothing further to say on the subject therein.28 This was consistent with and carried into his 
memoirs his contemporary concern to avoid alarming the public. At the time the Prime 
Minister made clear to Bomber Command, responsible for the nuclear-armed V-force 
bombers, the need therefore to eschew any overt preparations. There was accordingly no 
reference in Macmillan’s memoirs to the shift on the morning of 27 October from Alert 
Condition 4 (with one crew at 15 minutes readiness) to Alert Condition 3, with six and then 
12 aircraft at this level of preparedness. He was himself probably unaware that the entire 
force of some 120 bombers was then placed on cockpit readiness, within five minutes of take-
off, for much of that afternoon.29 Alert Condition 3 remained in place until 5 November.  
There may be a further reason for Macmillan’s reticence on this subject. He had taken the 
view when Foreign Secretary in 1955 that nuclear weapons had abolished war.30 No doubt he 
was unwilling to emphasize in ‘On the Brink’ how close he came to being proved wrong on 
this, or the extent of his personal responsibility for preparations which would have eclipsed in 
their outcome even the hideousness of the Great War. His ongoing drive to negotiate a ban on 
nuclear tests, which Bruce saw as almost an obsession, was similarly shaped by his acute 
awareness of global anxieties about the military and environmental threats posed by these 
new and horrific weapons.  
Macmillan’s concern for speedy action reflected the same concern to manage public opinion, 
not just in Britain but around the world. His fear was that otherwise demand for a peace 
conference could grow, fed by European public opinion sceptical about being brought to the 
brink of nuclear war by Americans now having to live, as they themselves had long done, 
under the Russian nuclear shadow.31 As he told Kennedy in the early hours of 23 October, ‘if 
we are forced to a conference all the cards are in this man’s hands’.32 Indeed, Macmillan’s 
notes in preparation for this conversation include the observation ‘If you aim at a conference 
would it not be better to have a fait accompli first?’33  
Macmillan’s views on the risks involved in a conference can seem inconsistent with his 
previous record on the subject. After all, he was an inveterate enthusiast for a renewal of the 
East-West conversations he had participated in as Foreign Secretary in 1955, which he had 
tried to revive in the run-up to the abortive Paris summit of 1960.34 Some kind of conference 
was therefore naturally at the forefront of his mind early in the crisis. The question was, 
however, what outcome could be expected from such an event? After all, as Macmillan noted 
to Ormsby-Gore on 22 October, such an event would provide a perfect opportunity for the 
Soviets to broach issues like Berlin, which the British were keen not to entangle in the Cuban 
crisis. This risk, and the chance that such an event would be used to ‘endanger the unity of 
the [NATO] Alliance’, was also very much the theme of the Prime Minister’s remarks to the 
first Cabinet meeting of the crisis on 23 October.35 A conference was therefore to be seen as a 
last resort option. The Prime Minister made it clear that ‘I could not allow a situation in 
Europe or in the world to develop which looks like escalating into war without trying some 
action by calling a conference on my own’, but this was for the ambassador’s ‘personal 
information only’. It proved unnecessary to pursue this option. Accordingly, this particular 
passage was not included in the extensive extract from this telegram to Ormsby-Gore 
reproduced in ‘On the Brink’.36 Nor was Macmillan’s brief revival of the idea of some kind 
of limited summit later on 27 October when he feared the crisis was heading towards 
conflict.37 
On the other hand, a conference which enabled progress on more general disarmament issues, 
not least on Macmillan’s aspirations for a test ban, could certainly be desirable, if feasible. 
Whether the Americans might support such an idea for a general conference, with Cuba as a 
preliminary, was therefore raised by Home with Ormsby-Gore on 24 October. The 
ambassador, however, decided not to raise this with the President. It did not accord with how 
the Administration was trying to present the crisis: as the ambassador noted, ‘for the 
Americans this is a clear challenge by the Soviet Union and....Castro is a mere cypher in the 
game’. Home’s idea was therefore a non-starter;38 thereafter discussion of a conference 
dropped from British contributions to the crisis. Nor, apart from brief and isolated references 
(for instance on p.212), does it feature in ‘On the Brink’. 
The risks of being pushed into talks from which the Soviets would be the main beneficiaries 
were made apparent by the groups who, in the early stages of the crisis, called for such a 
conference. These included the non-aligned countries supporting the Ghana/United Arab 
Republic (Egypt) resolution to the United Nations Security Council on 24 October. This, and 
the accompanying calls for an international conference from President Nkrumah of Ghana, 
risked presenting the crisis as occasioned by the American quarantine, rather than the placing 
of Soviet missiles on Cuba. A conference on such terms was clearly attractive to the Soviets; 
the Polish ambassador inviting himself to visit Home at the Foreign Office on the morning of 
24 October to present a suggestion along these lines. He was firmly rebuffed by the Foreign 
Secretary, well aware that attention should be focused instead upon the missiles already in 
place on the island.39 Talks along these lines were fraught with dangers. 
This was made further apparent when U Thant, under non-aligned pressure, despatched to 
Kennedy and Khrushchev messages on the afternoon (New York time) of 24 October, calling 
for a standstill in both Soviet shipments and the quarantine pending talks. While Macmillan 
made no mention in ‘On the Brink’ of the Ghanaian or Polish initiatives, he made clear 
therein his doubts about U Thant’s intervention, recording his comments in his telephone call 
with Kennedy that evening that ‘I think that’s rather tiresome of him because it looks sensible 
and yet it’s very bad’. It was bad because, as Kennedy had just noted, it distracted from the 
American goal of removing the missile sites, on which work was steadily continuing.40 It was 
also, as Macmillan noted in his diary, that ‘Now that [the] Russians have been proved blatant 
liars, no unpoliced agreement with them is possible’.41  
This meant that proof of Soviet duplicity had to be provided, not least for the benefit of the 
British public and sceptical opinions, particularly in the non-aligned world. As Macmillan 
notes in ‘On the Brink’, his reaction to the photographic evidence of the missile sites Bruce 
showed him on 22 October was that they had to be widely publicized with expert 
interpretation. British pressure and Bruce’s support led to sanitized versions of the pictures 
being released in London on 23 October. Macmillan in ‘On the Brink’ incorrectly claims that 
these photographs were first publicized at the Security Council on that day. There is no doubt 
that their presentation there by the US ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, was one of the most 
theatrical moments of the crisis. However, it did not happen until two days later and again 
was almost certainly with British encouragement.42 
Meanwhile, on 23 October, Macmillan met with a Labour delegation who asked if he would 
go to Washington,43 as Attlee had done at a similar juncture during the Korean War. Though 
he raised this possibility with Kennedy the following evening, in his diary the Prime Minister 
merely noted ‘They hadn’t much to say’.44 Nor did his diary entry refer to the related 
problems of managing the press and public opinion, despite a note from his private secretary, 
Tim Bligh, warning that lobby correspondents were asking if Britain had been consulted on 
the developing crisis.45 Such material does not appear to have been the bundles taken from 
Downing Street amongst which Glyn-Jones ferretted out the background information for this 
chapter. Macmillan did nevertheless meet with the lobby correspondents on the evening of 25 
October, noting ‘The consumption of alcoholic refreshment was extraordinary’.46 
Meanwhile, on 24 October at 2.00pm (Greenwich Mean Time [GMT]), the quarantine around 
Cuba came into force. At around 11.30pm47 (British Summer Time [BST]) that evening 
Macmillan again spoke to Kennedy. Apart from the U Thant proposals and Kennedy’s 
concern to make sure Macmillan had the arguments needed to counter the Opposition in the 
Commons debate scheduled for the following day,48 the main item was a question from 
Kennedy on whether or not, if work continued on the missiles ‘Do we then tell them that if 
they don’t get the missiles out, that we’re going to invade Cuba?’ Notwithstanding his earlier 
belligerence, Macmillan now asked for time to think about this. Kennedy had confirmed early 
in the conversation that some Soviet ships had turned around. This, U Thant’s intervention 
and the soft answer Khrushchev gave to the Acting Secretary-General, led the Prime Minister 
to conclude in his response, sent on 25 October and reproduced in ‘On the Brink’, that 
‘events have gone too far’.49 Macmillan may have been an ardent anti-appeaser in the 1930s. 
Now, however, he felt UN inspection of the sites to ensure their immobilisation would 
remove the threat posed by the missiles, without the need for military action.  
It is not clear at what time this document was despatched, but a hand-written note by 
Macmillan’s foreign policy private secretary, Philip de Zulueta, suggests that it was at 
10.25am (BST).50 This idea of immobilisation, however, hardly featured when Kennedy and 
Macmillan had their third conversation of the crisis after 11.00pm (BST) on 25 October.51 
Macmillan briefly raised it as the main objective of the Americans, but the President 
concentrated on naval aspects of the crisis. The Americans, however, were well-aware of the 
significance of the missiles already on the island, knowing as they did that the Soviets were 
still pushing on apace with the bases under construction on Cuba. Accordingly, Kennedy 
observed to ExComm the following morning (26 October) – confirmed to Macmillan that 
evening – that additional action was needed to remove these weapons.52 Forcible removal 
was the option stressed to the British, French and West German ambassadors in Washington 
that evening. At the same meeting the ambassadors were told the American estimation that 
the Soviets had intended a showdown over Berlin on completion of the Cuban bases, to 
coincide with Khrushchev’s upcoming visit to the US.53 That, of course, depended on 
completion without detection, no longer a possibility. Khrushchev also plainly failed to 
consult his ambassadors in Washington or at the UN in New York either about the missile 
deployment or the likely American reaction. Towards the end of the crisis Britain’s 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sir Frank Roberts, acutely recalled ‘Khrushchev’s well-
known proclivity for setting out courses of action without knowing where they could lead 
him, coupled with his undoubted talent for making the best of the resulting situation’.54 
Whether his improvisation on 26 October turned out best for him is another matter. This 
consisted of a first letter in which Khrushchev suggested to Kennedy the possibility of 
dismantling the missiles in Cuba, in return for a guarantee that Cuba would not be invaded, 
tightened in a second message (on 27 October) by linkage with the quid pro quo of American 
withdrawal of ‘analogous weapons’ such as the 15 Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missiles (IRBMs) installed in Turkey in 1961. 
Neither Macmillan nor Kennedy was aware of this when they spoke for the fourth time 
during the crisis at 11.15pm (BST) on 26 October,55 though the latter mentioned some 
unofficial hints along similar lines from Russian officials. The President had in fact conceded 
the merits of such a guarantee for Cuba in ExComm earlier that day. Macmillan was not 
made aware of this, or of the way in which the Americans intended to use the Brazilians to 
float this idea.56 Such a possibility, however, clearly piqued the Prime Minister’s interest.57 
He then returned to the idea of a UN inspection team to ‘ensure that these missiles were made 
inoperable during the period of any conference or discussion’, suggesting that it be led by U 
Thant, before dropping into the conversation his own swop proposal, the immobilisation of 
the 60 Thor IRBMs deployed in Britain in 1958-59.58 This would have been a significant 
gesture as normally 65 per cent of this force (39 missiles) was on 30 minutes readiness. 
Indeed, at 11.00am on 27 October (BST) the Prime Minister agreed a move to Alert 
Condition 3 for Bomber Command, which meant that 59 of the Thors were at 15 minutes 
readiness, remaining so until 5 November.59 None of this, however, was mentioned at the 
time in Macmillan’s diary, and it was only obliquely referred to in ‘On the Brink’. Similarly, 
the fact that, despite the President’s non-committal response, particularly to the Thor swop, 
these three schemes were then reiterated in a message to Kennedy in the early hours of 27 
October (BST) was also passed over in silence.60  
There are, indeed, no diary entries at all for Saturday 27 October. Macmillan and Home had 
cancelled all their weekend engagements.61 From the diary of Macmillan’s press secretary, 
Harold Evans, it is clear that the day was spent in great anxiety that Kennedy might have 
decided that there was no other way and ‘was hell-bent on destroying the missile sites. This 
carried the strong possibility of Soviet retaliation in Berlin or elsewhere, with the prospect of 
escalation into nuclear war’. In these circumstances, Macmillan ‘felt he must intervene’ in 
ways which would achieve the immobilisation of the weapons without resort to US military 
action.62 These anxieties would not have been assuaged by Ormsby-Gore’s telegram received 
at 4.00am that morning. Reporting the meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his 
fellow ambassadors from France and West Germany the previous evening (Washington time) 
he noted that the Secretary of State, ‘When asked what further action the United States might 
take if they failed to obtain a satisfactory outcome in the talks with U Thant, he indicated that 
they would have to consider destroying the sites by bombing’. At least Rusk confirmed that 
the three principal European allies would be consulted before any such eventuality 
occurred.63 
On 27 October ExComm began to meet at around 10.00am Washington time, by which time 
it was already 3.00pm in London. For Macmillan much of the day had passed. It is therefore 
difficult to endorse the claim of scholars such as May and Zelikow that both Macmillan and 
Ormsby-Gore became de facto members of ExComm during the crisis.64 The fact that neither 
was physically present, and that Macmillan sometimes only received limited reports on what 
was transpiring in Washington from Ormsby-Gore and often had to wait for hours for 
detailed telegrams to come through necessarily limited his direct knowledge of events across 
the Atlantic. One example is the news of the shooting down of the American U2 surveillance 
aeroplane over Cuba, which very much exercised ExComm on the afternoon of 27 October.65 
Macmillan talked in some detail about this incident in his BBC interview in 1973. At the 
time, however, he was only belatedly apprised of it.66 A telegram from the British embassy in 
Cuba bearing this news did not arrive until in London 6.38am on 28 October, having 
seemingly been nine hours in transmission.67 Another example is that, in the ExComm 
discussions early on 27 October, the text arrived of Khrushchev’s second message to 
Kennedy. In contrast, the copy of this message in the Prime Minister’s files is from the news 
agency Reuters, a transcript of the broadcast on Radio Moscow. 
Home’s hand-written notes on the British copy of this message observed that the build-up 
goes on – a point made by Kennedy in his noon (Washington time) broadcast – whilst the US 
had rejected the Turkey linkage. Home’s comments ended, ‘Still trying to keep it to this 
[Western] hemisphere’.68 This kind of language no doubt reflected British attempts to 
respond to American sensitivities, tutored by the 1823 Monroe doctrine, about outside 
interference in their part of the world. 
It is not clear when Home made these notes. However, it is apparent from the despatch Home 
sent to Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Sir Patrick Dean, at 3pm (London time) that day that 
various British schemes for UN involvement in immobilisation were indeed designed to keep 
the issue in the Western hemisphere, avoiding ‘reciprocity in the European area’. Home’s 
suggestions therefore focused on U Thant leading an inspection team to Cuba, Cuban 
inviolability and/or of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The reciprocity in the European 
area that the Thor offer undoubtedly constituted was additional, something to be used ‘if it 
would make all the difference’.69 A telegram sent to the Washington embassy at 2.30pm 
asked that Rusk also be informed of these instructions.70 
It was not until 8.07pm on 27 October that Kennedy’s response to Macmillan’s memorandum 
of their previous evening’s conversation arrived in London. This message is not mentioned in 
Harold Evans’ diary, but it seems to have been the cause of the anxiety he noted. It gave 
Kennedy’s reaction to Khrushchev’s broadcast, concluding: 
This morning I authorised a release restating our position that work on the Cuban 
bases, which is still continuing, must stop before we can consider other proposals.  
I do not feel that this country should allow itself to become engaged in negotiations 
affecting the individual security interests of our NATO allies. Any initiatives in this 
respect, it seems to me, should appropriately come from Europe. 
I would appreciate your views on the current situation as it develops. In the meantime, 
I continue to believe that we must secure the actual dismantling of the missiles 
currently in Cuba as the first order of business.71 
In his response – seemingly despatched an hour or so later following discussions with Home, 
Rab Butler, Ted Heath, Peter Thorneycroft and the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign 
Office (and former ambassador to the US) Sir Harold Caccia72 – Macmillan immediately 
indicated ‘I am in full agreement with your last two paragraphs’. In particular, the 
penultimate paragraph was interpreted as an invitation for an initiative along the lines already 
broached with the President. The Prime Minister accordingly put forward a draft message to 
be sent to Khrushchev suggesting a standstill for negotiations during which: 
1. The Soviet Government would agree to:- 
(a) No further work on the missile sites in Cuba; 
(b) No imports of ballistic missiles into the island; 
(c) The existing missiles in Cuba being made inoperable (which can be 
done without any breach of military security). 
All this under U.N. authority. 
2. At the same time the U.S. Government would agree to:- 
(a) Lift the quarantine, and 
(b) Not take any physical action against Cuba during the standstill. 
In a final paragraph the Thor offer was then reiterated.73 
Seemingly it was not until after this point that a telegram from Dean arrived at 9.31pm (BST) 
indicating U Thant’s response to Home’s proposals. Dean reported that in the conversation he 
had with U Thant at 1.00pm (New York time), it was clear that the idea of following in the 
footsteps of his late predecessor, Dag Hammarskjöld, and actually going into the field to 
address problems had not occurred to the Acting UN Secretary-General. U Thant, however, 
considered the idea of leading an inspection team, but treated it as separate from issues such 
as Turkey or the inviolability of Cuba.  
Dean did not pass on to his American counterparts the Thor offer idea.74 From his telegram 
received at 11.22pm (BST) it is not clear whether Ormsby-Gore mentioned this to the 
President either when he saw him that morning (Washington time). The only part of the 
British proposals the President appears to have responded to, from this account, is the U 
Thant mission idea, which Kennedy said ‘could be a useful initiative’, depending on timing. 
The rest of Ormsby-Gore’s telegram was taken up with how the Americans were responding 
to the Khrushchev broadcast and with Kennedy’s thoughts about Turkey. The President’s 
view was reported as ‘that there was little military value to be attached to the missiles in 
Turkey’. The issue was how the Turks would react.75  
The Turkish ambassador to the UN made his government’s displeasure apparent to Stevenson 
at a meeting on the evening of 27 October.76 ExComm had meanwhile been discussing how 
the Americans should react to Khrushchev’s linkage of Cuba and Turkey for much of the day. 
From a military perspective, the issue was largely symbolic. As Robert McNamara, the US 
Secretary of Defense pointed out, the Jupiters in Turkey were ‘more obsolete than the Thor 
missile. The British have recognised the obsolescence of the Thor and have decided to take it 
out and replace it with other systems’. Clearly, as Under-Secretary of State George Ball 
noted, similar arrangements could be made with the Turks.77 
The problem, as Ball earlier observed, is that once such matters were broached with the Turks 
this American concession ‘will be all over Western Europe, and our position would have 
been undermined’. As Macmillan noted in ‘On the Brink’, if there was a deal over Turkey, 
‘All America’s allies would feel that to avoid the Cuban threat the U.S. Government had 
bargained away their protection’. He, however, was under the impression that 
‘Kennedy….never wavered on this issue’.78 This, indeed, was very much the impression – for 
exactly the reasons given by Macmillan – which the President wished to convey. As Kennedy 
noted at the time, this was made more problematic because the Turkey/Cuba swop had been 
raised publicly by Khrushchev. His approach to ExComm that day was therefore about how 
to respond without appearing to cave in, not least to his NATO allies.79 US ambassadors were 
therefore told to avoid any Cuba/Turkey linkage. Bruce was certainly under the impression 
that the Turkey option had been rejected.80  
To reinforce this message, ExComm agreed that Thomas Finletter, the US Permanent 
representative, should brief a NATO Council in Paris. His briefing notes were passed on to 
the British government at some time on 28 October. Significantly, they claimed that hopes of 
a solution were diminished by Khrushchev’s letter of 27 October ‘linking Cuban settlement 
to withdrawal of NATO Jupiters from Turkey, but we continue to press for solution in Cuban 
framework alone’. Instead, the continuing build-up of the missile sites was stressed. Allies 
were also warned that some ships were still heading to the quarantine zone. The NATO 
Council was thus informed that ‘In these circumstances the US Government may find it 
necessary within a short time in its own interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western 
hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary to remove this growing threat 
to the hemisphere’.81  
The US message to its allies was therefore that military action, for which preparations 
throughout the crisis had been taking place, may be imminent and that missile trades were not 
on the table. As noted in Ormsby-Gore’s telegram received at 3.38am (London time) on 28 
October, their line on the Thor offer was therefore that ‘this w[oul]d look as though the US 
w[oul]d be prepared to trade the security of European nations for US security in the Western 
hemisphere’.82 A similar line was also taken by the President’s National Security Advisor, 
McGeorge Bundy, in a call to de Zulueta at 1.30am (BST).83 They had a further conversation 
at 4.00am (BST) in which Bundy conveyed the essence of the Finletter briefing to the British, 
played down progress at the UN and suggested that the Prime Minister’s Thor proposal ‘is 
not yet right and what we would much rather have is active participation....in the North 
Atlantic Council’ set for 10.00am on 28 October [Paris time]’.84 Bundy’s subsequent notes 
on this conversation make it clear that, while the US did not want to appear to cave in before 
its European allies, those same allies were being encouraged to do the caving for them. 
Bundy recorded that he ‘tried to hint….delicately that if the UK is interested in the Jupiter 
proposal, it should say so in the North Atlantic Council’.85 However, the UK was not 
interested in the Jupiter proposal, which was seen as positively dangerous. Throughout the 
crisis the British had instead been concerned to keep it confined to the western hemisphere 
and avoid any linkage between Cuba and anywhere else, with the possible exception of the 
British Thors. This aim to keep the crisis in Cuba was very much behind Home’s instructions 
to Dean on 27 October. Not only was de Zulueta therefore not interested in taking up the 
Jupiter option (having been led to believe that the US were not either), but – particularly at 
that time in the morning – he was not even attuned to taking up the subtle hints that he should 
be.86  
Bundy used alarmist language to try to push the British towards picking up his hints. It had 
the opposite effect to that intended. Not for the first time, Bundy misread Macmillan.87 The 
Prime Minister, like his private secretary, missed the hints but was alarmed by the tone of the 
rest of the conversation. He was no more reassured by the President’s reply to Khrushchev, 
responding to his offer on Cuba and ignoring Turkey, which was received in London at 
1.30am.88 Subsequently in ‘On the Brink’ Macmillan was to credit this with successfully 
solving the crisis without resort to conflict, passing over very briefly his manoeuvres of that 
fraught weekend.89 Yet on that Sunday morning of 28 October he clearly remained anxious. 
A draft message to Kennedy spoke of Macmillan’s concern that U Thant was not getting 
anywhere. The Prime Minister wanted to contact Khrushchev directly ‘when it is apparent 
that he is not giving way and before you are forced by his stubbornness or by the local 
situation to take drastic action. Can you help me on timing?’ The text as actually transmitted, 
seemingly at 9.52am GMT, was rather more anodyne, but still contained the timing 
question.90  
In ‘On the Brink’ Macmillan says that he then decided the timing issue himself in the absence 
of further communications from an early morning Washington.91 There is certainly no 
evidence of an American response. The message transmitted to Moscow at around noon (and 
delivered by Roberts at 2.35pm Moscow time), however, was rather different from the draft 
he had sent to Kennedy the previous day. By then Macmillan seems to have seen Dean’s 
telegram which had arrived in London at 5.28am, reporting that Castro had accepted the U 
Thant visit proposal.92 Accordingly, Macmillan’s message to Khrushchev briefly touched on 
dealing with the missiles in Cuba through the United Nations,93 before moving on to 
responding positively to the Soviet leader’s own olive branch on a nuclear test ban agreement 
in his message to Kennedy on 27 October.94 Evans described this as ‘a mouselike message’.95 
In the absence of American approval of any other message, it however picked up on the one 
aspect of Khrushchev’s communication that Macmillan, who had long been seeking such a 
test ban agreement, could legitimately address.  
Bruce’s view was that it was ‘designed to impress [Khrushchev] with British solidarity on US 
Cuban policy’. Certainly there was nothing in it the US could object to. Macmillan’s main 
regret, he told Bruce, was that he had not sent it ‘several hours earlier’.96 As it was little time 
had elapsed when, towards the end of Macmillan’s lunch, the message came through that 
Khrushchev had said to Kennedy ‘that the equipment on Cuba “which you call offensive” 
would be dismantled packed up and returned to the Soviet Union’.97 After all the tension the 
reaction of Macmillan and Home was, Bruce noted, ‘mildly euphoric. Now, perhaps, a 
number of people immobilized during this emergency can devote future weekends to 
depleting the game-birds who are ravaging British agriculture’.98 
Macmillan noted in his diary that the British message, not given to the press until 4.15pm 
(GMT), appeared to be ‘backing the horse after the race’.99 Nevertheless, this may not have 
been a bad thing: as Ormsby-Gore pointed out that evening to Rusk in Washington, rather 
than allowing the Soviets to seize the initiative, the West must get in first with their proposals 
for peace, picked up in Macmillan’s message.100 Now was the time to seek the general 
negotiations the Prime Minister had toyed with at the start of the crisis. From Macmillan’s 
point of view it certainly gave a fillip to his efforts for a test ban agreement and a reduction in 
cold war tensions. It was therefore appropriate that he ended ‘On the Brink’ with a quote 
from a letter he received from the Russian leader on 27 November 1962: ‘I fully share your 
view, as well as that of President Kennedy, that the Cuban crisis has led to a better 
understanding of the need for a prompt settlement of acute international problems’.101 
By the time Macmillan wrote this chapter both Khrushchev and Kennedy were dead. 
Khrushchev published some expurgated memoirs in 1971, the year of his death. However, the 
assassination of John Kennedy in 1963 ensured that the main Western principal in the crisis 
did not survive to publish memoirs. The only substantial rival account available at the time 
was therefore Robert Kennedy’s posthumously-published version, ghost-written for him by 
Theodore Sorensen,102 to which Macmillan obliquely refers briefly in his own book.103 David 
Nunnerley’s journalistic account, Prime Kennedy and Britain (1972) appeared too late to be 
noticed in the preparation of ‘On the Brink’.104  
This chapter therefore largely relied upon contemporary materials. This prompted concern 
from the Cabinet Office, when it came to vetting At the End of the Day, about the plethora of 
verbatim quotes from classified letters, minutes and transcripts of telephone conversations. 
The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, asked if these extensive extracts could be 
paraphrased as ‘it would be particularly embarrassing for us if verbatim quotations from 
American sources (mainly President Kennedy’s messages) were published in this country’.105 
A total of 44 changes were suggested by the Cabinet Office,106 17 of these relating to ‘On the 
Brink’. One was merely a correction to Macmillan’s account of Cuban history. Four were 
deletions suggested to avoid giving offence to foreign governments who might have objected, 
for instance, to a diary quotation referring to the French as contemptuous, the Germans as 
very frightened, the Italians as windy and the Scandinavians as sour as well as windy. This 
was not only undiplomatic but, certainly as far as the French were concerned, incorrect.107 
The only deletion recommended that Macmillan jibed at – writing ‘why?’ in the margin – 
was any reference to the Thors. Presumably he was wondering why he was asked not to 
mention a weapon which had been decommissioned ten years earlier. He nevertheless 
complied with these requests, with the exception of brief passing references to the Thor 
offer.108 The other 11 changes recommended were to summarise the extracts. This, however, 
clearly had limited effect on their preponderance in the chapter. Macmillan may have 
complained that Churchill’s The Hinge of Fate (the fourth volume of his memoir of The 
Second World War) contained ‘too many memoranda and minutes printed verbatim. This 
hinders the flow of the narrative’.109 Nevertheless, his account of the Cuban missile crisis 
suffered even more from this tendency. Whereas parts of Churchill’s The World Crisis and 
The Second World War rely on such documents for more than 40 per cent of the text,110 the 
percentage of original documents in the text of ‘On the Brink’ was closer to 70-80 per cent. 
Cabinet Office strictures clearly had limited effect, with the publisher reluctant to comply so 
close to publication to requests for changes that ‘would spoil the book and entail very 
expensive correction if we were to paraphrase them’.111 
This probably also reflected a sense of the centrality of the Cuba section to the marketing of 
the book. The second paragraph of the dust jacket text proclaimed ‘The British side of the 
Cuba crisis is told here for the first time. The continuous contact that took place, sometimes 
several times a day, between Prime Minister and President reveals the closeness of their 
personal relationship and shows how strong was British influence and support.’ This clearly 
developed the idea of repeated calls between the two leaders, rather than the total of four 
telephone conversations during the height of the crisis. A similar line was also stressed in the 
pre-publication publicity.  
The object clearly was not just to puff the book but also to engage with media and Opposition 
allegations at the time of the Cuban crisis that British influence with the US had been 
negligible. The Labour frontbencher Richard Crossman, who had worked as Macmillan’s 
propaganda officer at Allied Forces Headquarters in North Africa during the Second World 
War, wrote in The Guardian on 26 October 1962 that these events exploded the myth of 
British influence.112 This theme of lack of consultation was taken up by his party leader, 
Hugh Gaitskell, in the Commons debate on the Queen’s Speech on 30 October 1962.113 
Amongst the Opposition there are hints from other leading figures such as Harold Wilson that 
this line was taken so as to justify their then argument that nuclear weapons did not buy 
Britain influence and therefore ought to be abandoned.114  
Macmillan’s attempts to counter this in the House on 30 October 1962 were unconvincing, 
not least because he was unable to go into detail on the substance of his talks with 
Kennedy.115 Macmillan told the Cabinet that Kennedy and his advisers ‘had shown 
themselves ready to ask for and to consider advice. This had been done with commitment on 
either side’, but disclose of these talks might embarrass less-privileged European allies.116 A 
key objective in ‘On the Brink’ was therefore, as Macmillan admitted, to dispel these 
accusations ‘that there was no “special relationship’ between London and Washington’ by 
establishing the regularity and quality of their discussions.117 This was achieved, for instance, 
by including Kennedy’s message of 22 October, suggesting that the two men ‘discuss the 
situation between ourselves by means of our private channel of communication’.118 This 
channel was the KY-9 scrambler telephone, installed on 6 September 1961, supplemented by 
the KW-26 teleprinter. Macmillan commented in his diary on 4 November 1962 that these 
worked without a hitch, after a summer during which the link had been bedevilled by 
technical faults. This was not a universal view, The Times on 27 November 1962 reporting an 
American press briefing which belittled the Macmillan-Kennedy conversations and suggested 
the Prime Minister disliked this form of communication. The real problem, de Zulueta wrote 
to Ormsby-Gore, was that the President kept on forgetting he had to take his finger off the 
button to allow Macmillan to speak.119  
The scrambler phone also distorted voices. This may account for the seemingly 
unenlightening nature of the transcripts. But then, as anyone who has tried to recapture the 
fire of a Lloyd George from the reproduction in Hansard would know, transcripts convey 
only a part of orality. In a passage Macmillan drafted to add to the chapter but which was not 
in the end included he noted ‘We used flat and commonplace phrases of everyday life and 
humdrum affairs. Nevertheless, we both knew we were discussing the future, and perhaps the 
survival of the civilised world’.120 In talk between two men who clearly trusted and liked 
each other there are always likely to be unspoken assumptions and understandings that a 
transcript may not capture, such as the somewhat hesitant way in which Macmillan 
introduced the Thor offer on 26 October. Nevertheless, Kennedy’s message of 22 October 
warmly observed: ‘It is a source of great personal satisfaction to me that you and I can keep 
in close touch with each other by rapid and secure means at a time like this, and I intend to 
keep you fully informed of my thinking as the situation evolves’.121  
As it turned out, however, Macmillan was far from fully informed throughout the crisis. One 
example is that when writing ‘On the Brink’ Macmillan remained unaware of the deal the US 
had made with the Soviets over the Turkish missiles. Kennedy was also selective in the 
aspects of crisis management he sounded out the Prime Minister’s views on. British influence 
on the conduct of the crisis did not, despite the image deliberately cultivated by the extensive 
edited transcripts of transatlantic telephone calls presented in ‘On the Brink’, emerge through 
such direct means. 
In the past it has often been thought that the main British contributions to the management of 
the Cuban crisis were confined to advice from Ormsby-Gore about the breadth of the 
quarantine, and the pressure that led to publication of the photographs of the missile sites. 
Macmillan clearly believed that his ambassador did make a significant contribution to the 
first of these.122 As noted above, however, Macmillan’s account of the second in ‘On the 
Brink’ is inaccurate. Moreover, it understates the British role in encouraging the Americans 
to publicize their photographic evidence of the missiles, not least in the UN. 
This may reflect Macmillan’s tendency in his subsequent writings systematically to 
underplay the importance of the UN in his thinking at the time of the crisis. Dean is, indeed, 
only once mentioned in the whole of At the End of the Day, as having played a useful 
supporting role during the Cuban missile crisis to Stevenson, whom Macmillan cordially 
disliked.123 ‘On the Brink’ similarly occluded – not least because of the Cabinet Office 
stipulation not to offend foreign governments – the very considerable efforts expended by the 
British on inter-Allied and inter-Commonwealth relations during the crisis to maintain 
solidarity with the Americans.  
This tendency has also been replicated in later literature. Although Macmillan credited the 
use of the UN with the resolution of the crisis in the Cabinet of 29 October,124 in the 
historiography this dimension has until recently been overshadowed by the Thor offer. 
However, in the same conversation that he raised the latter with Kennedy, on 26 October, he 
first signalled his support for the idea of Cuban inviolability and then reiterated the idea of a 
UN mission to ensure the missiles were inoperable. These measures would also help to head 
off the tendency of the increasingly assertive non-aligned countries at the UN to focus on the 
quarantine and not on the larger problem of the missiles.125 As the quarantine started to bite, 
these became the crucial issues for Macmillan, hence his change of mind over the merits of 
military action. Indeed, getting a credible UN inspection regime in place was a key means of 
avoiding such military action, with all the risks that implied. A credible inspection regime 
was also, incidentally, a way of making progress on the test ban issue. The Thor offer was 
thus a backup, ‘a third point’ as Macmillan put it in the conversation of 26 October: its minor 
role in ‘On the Brink’ is accordingly appropriate.126 
That morning Kennedy had reminded ExComm that there were three ways to remove the 
Soviet missiles; by negotiation, trade or invasion.127 As the crisis developed Macmillan 
moved rapidly from the third option to concentrating on the first, through the auspices of the 
UN, with the second playing a minor role in the form of the Thor proposal. Indeed, the 
necessity of the first option was pointed up by the risk otherwise of a US invasion, the 
unpredictable consequences of which Macmillan by the end of the crisis clearly feared. UN 
involvement was seen as a key means of providing the reassurance necessary, given the lack 
of trust between the parties, to make progress on the objectives of inviolability and 
inspection. These two objectives reflected the ideas floated in Macmillan’s conversation with 
the President on 26 October and formed the core of his message to Kennedy on the following 
evening. It is not clear what time this arrived in Washington. It certainly was not directly 
discussed in ExComm that afternoon. However, some hours later, Kennedy’s reply to 
Khrushchev  released about 8.00pm (Washington time) on 27 October was much closer in 
tone to Macmillan than it was to the drafts being prepared by various members of ExComm, 
not least in highlighting these same themes of inviolability and inspection under the aegis of 
the UN.128 This was the message that Macmillan in ‘On the Brink’ saw as solving the 
crisis.129  
We now know that Khrushchev had decided to withdraw the missiles two days earlier. 
However, his problem then was how to manage this process?130 The Turkey swop idea he 
raised was a means to cover this withdrawal, but one which ironically heightened tension 
with the Americans. Interestingly, Macmillan’s speculations about Khrushchev’s conduct of 
the crisis, written in his diary on 4 November 1962 and largely reproduced in ‘On the Brink’, 
make it clear he was aware that two sites were not comparable. ‘The Turkey base is useful, 
but not vital. Cuba was vital’. The latter, however, was threatened by the American build-up 
to an invasion planned for 29 October which, as Macmillan recognised, could not be stopped 
by conventional military means. By withdrawal Khrushchev avoided the risk of having to use 
nuclear weapons, but also preserved Castro, Soviet prestige and his missiles, which were 
shipped home.131 Indeed, to some extent Khrushchev was also given the credit as the 
peacemaker, in contrast to the bellicose Americans, in the non-aligned world.132 Macmillan’s 
immediate judgement of Khrushchev’s decision-making was thus not without merit. What he 
did not know, either at the time or subsequently, was that Khrushchev also succeeded in 
secretly getting the American missiles out of Turkey and Italy as well. 
In his comments in ExComm on 26 October Kennedy implied that the three options were 
alternative strategies. In practice, he pursued all simultaneously. Macmillan was never aware 
of this. He did not know that Bobby Kennedy had indicated to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Russian 
ambassador to Washington, that the Jupiters could quietly be withdrawn from Turkey within 
four to five months should a satisfactory arrangement on Cuba be reached. In part this was 
because the British seemingly did not imagine such a possibility, as being outside the 
Western hemisphere. But it was also because the Americans deliberately misled them, their 
other Allies and indeed their own ambassadors on this point. Roberts noted in his despatch on 
29 October that his American counterpart fully shared his surprise at the rapid and complete 
Soviet climb-down.133 Deliberate American dissimulation both distracted from the Turkey 
offer and ramped up as far as their allies were concerned the risk of warfare.134 The worse 
example of lack of consultation from the Americans was thus not one Macmillan could try to 
downplay in ‘On the Brink’. This was because he was not himself ever aware of it. Ironically, 
however, neither were those who had in 1962 complained about the lack of consultation by 
the Americans. 
When this story did eventually come out,135 it reinforced notions of the lack of British 
influence. Macmillan’s government were portrayed as pursuing a Thor trade that would never 
shape Washington’s thinking, because the Americans were already moving to the Turkey 
swop instead. The Thor offer was thus easily dismissed merely as reflecting, as Macmillan’s 
own diary reference on 4 November put it, ‘the frightful desire to do something’. This is 
despite the fact that the same sentence went on to acknowledge that ‘not to do anything 
(except to talk to the President and keep Europe and the Commonwealth calm and firm) was 
prob[ably] the right answer’.136 Indeed, the British did not do anything that they considered 
out of keeping with the American line. The Thor offer went unpursued. More important were 
their efforts to promote the UN-validated way forward which became the basis on which a 
solution emerged. 
Before publication The Spectator referred to At the End of the Day as the most eagerly 
awaited volume of the memoirs.137 This, though, was because it expected revelations not 
about October 1962 but about the end of Macmillan’s premiership in October 1963. Cuba 
was not always as central to the reception of the book as the pre-publicity had assumed. Nor 
did it sell as well as The Spectator might have envisaged. At a time when respectable fiction 
sales were around 5,000 copies the figure reported of 20,326 non-US sales by the end of 1979 
was certainly good. However, it was still way behind the sales figures for the first two 
volumes of the autobiography.138 Furthermore, ‘On the Brink’ does not seem to have helped 
sales in the US. Just over two years after publication Harper & Row wrote that sales had been 
very slow and ‘we must let the book go out of print’.139  
In the US there was no tie-in television programme, as there was in Britain. Such a tie-in had 
been envisaged when the memoirs first started to appear. On 5-7 January 1966, for 
transmission to mark the first volume of memoirs, Macmillan was interviewed at Birch Grove 
over three days by John Grist, Nigel Lawson (who had been attached to Number 10 at the end 
of Macmillan’s premiership and by then moved on to edit The Spectator) and Charles 
Collingwood (of the US broadcaster, CBS).140 About two weeks later, CBS decided that they 
did not want to be tied to a trade publication.141 The BBC nevertheless paid $5,000 for the 
American rights to a programme that was not broadcast there, as well as £1,000 for the 
British programme.142 This was, as Grist noted, ‘a quite exceptional fee’.143 It, however, 
remained in place as the series was, like the memoirs, extended from the three programmes 
initially envisaged. The only substantial change was that from the second programme 
onwards the Canadian psephologist R. T. McKenzie, a professor from the London School of 
Economics, conducted each interview with Macmillan.  
Accordingly, by the time At the End of the Day appeared, these BBC interviews followed a 
familiar and well-tested format, with broadcast on the actual day of publication. On this 
occasion filming took place at Birch Grove on 6-8 August 1973. After filming the producer, 
Margaret Douglas, would usually then edit down about five hours of rushes into a single 
broadcast of fifty minutes. With At the End of the Day however, the BBC concluded that the 
material was so rich that they needed two programmes.144 The first dealt with Europe, 
economic problems, the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ cabinet reshuffle of July 1962 and 
culminated with Cuba. Suitably puffed in the BBC’s listing journal, the Radio Times,145 it 
was broadcast on 19 September 1973. The second, covering security and scandals, 
transmitted a week later on the day of publication. 
McKenzie had first interviewed Macmillan in 1954 and later wrote of his ‘genuine and deep 
affection for the greatest living Englishman’,146 an accolade which Macmillan – who 
modelled himself on Churchill in so many ways – no doubt deeply relished. Unlike Churchill, 
Macmillan was a consummate performer on television. McKenzie’s unobtrusive style 
provided a perfect foil. Together they developed an easy rapport which, through the medium 
of these programmes, as the Audience Research Report [ARR] testified, brought out 
Macmillan’s ‘qualities as a conversationalist, a person and as a politician’. As such, they also 
helped to develop Macmillan’s final career: he came across, the ARR reported, as an elder 
statesman in an age of pygmies. 
This was despite a limited audience share – being broadcast after the 9.00pm watershed –
estimated at not much more than 5 per cent of the British public.147 Newspaper reports of the 
programme, however, greatly extended its reach. In particular, all picked up the assertion 
made in the interview (but not in ‘On the Brink’) that Macmillan was rung three times a day 
by the President. This was a considerable exaggeration, as was Macmillan’s claim that he 
suggested publication of the photographic evidence of the missile sites. So was the statement 
that NATO only had two to three divisions in Western Europe at the time, facing some 100 
Soviet divisions.148 It, however, reinforced Macmillan’s preceding point about the risk that 
Berlin would be seized if the Americans had attacked Cuba. It was in such circumstances that 
Macmillan thought the Turkey swop idea so dangerous for ‘all credibility’ – including in 
Berlin – ‘in the American protection of Europe would have gone’. The Americans clearly 
agreed, hence in 1973 they continued to cover-up the fact that this swop had nonetheless 
happened. 
Macmillan’s exaggerations in the broadcast built up two key impressions. The first was of the 
risks, not least in Europe, during the crisis. The second was of Macmillan calmly and 
regularly responding to the President’s requests for advice. This was reinforced by 
McKenzie’s voiceover which introduced this section of the interview in which he pointed out 
that the ‘intimate personal link with Kennedy is one of the striking themes of Mr Macmillan’s 
book’.149 The journalists who reported on the programme clearly agreed, with the Daily Mail 
going so far as to headline its piece ‘How I helped to stop World War Three’.150  
In his more measured review of At the End of the Day Richard Crossman drew attention to 
the Churchillian approach adopted throughout Macmillan’s memoirs. Hitherto, however, he 
felt that Macmillan had done so with little success: whereas Churchill ‘stamped his 
personality on everything he wrote’, Macmillan did not. ‘In private conversation and, to a 
remarkable extent, on the television screen he has always been a very different person – 
debonair, adventurous, and deliciously cynical….Unfortunately, this private personality, 
which comes bouncing so gaily out of the little black box, is almost entirely excluded from 
his writing.’ For Crossman, however, At the End of the Day was one of the better volumes of 
the memoirs, and also successful in challenging Crossman’s contemporary impressions. He 
noted: 
At the time, many of us thought that Britain hadn’t been consulted. We couldn’t have 
been more wrong. The British Prime Minister was the only non-American completely 
in Kennedy’s confidence. So Kennedy at night….called up his old friend to try out his 
ideas….Macmillan has had to wait a long time before he could take the credit he 
deserves.151 
It has been observed that Churchill’s larding of his text with contemporary documents 
sometimes gave it a spurious authenticity.152 In this instance, even for a sceptical reviewer 
like Crossman, Macmillan seems to have succeeded in doing the same. Gregg Harken 
suggests that a common theme of the Cold War memoir is the settling of scores,153 and in this 
case Macmillan sought to achieve this by drawing attention to his extensive contacts with the 
President in a way he was unable to do at the time. ‘On the Brink’ does not seek to offer the 
blow-by-blow account of how Macmillan experienced the crisis attempted in this chapter. 
Significant phases and themes are excluded from the narrative. Instead, the impression was 
conveyed – and even more so in Macmillan’s skilful television performance – that Kennedy 
‘wanted to consult me all the time’. This was, however, more of a response to his 
contemporary British critics, like Crossman, than an accurate evocation of Macmillan’s 
experience of ‘that strange period’;154 in the process diverting attention from some of the key 
themes in the British approach to the crisis, such as the role the UN could play in managing a 
settlement. That in ‘On the Brink’ and a fortiori in his television interview with McKenzie, 
Macmillan was successful in responding to his contemporary critics is suggested by the 
comment in The Guardian’s review of the programme: 
The myth that Britain was left unconsulted by John Kennedy while he played poker 
with the fate of the world against Khrushchev over the 1962 Cuban missile crisis is 
finally dispelled by Harold Macmillan today. 
It is entirely appropriate that this article was entitled ‘Mac and Jack’ since the effect of 
Macmillan’s successive accounts of the Cuban missile crisis was indeed to establish, with 
some success, a misleading view of the British side of the Cuban missile crisis as essentially 
the Mac and Jack show.155  
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